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Abstract 
 
The business justification for multiple principals to hire a common agent is efficiency.  Our 
empirical study demonstrates that the creation of the common agent unilaterally depresses 
winning bids.  Additionally, the common agent was not only observed to be the dominant bidder 
but also paid significantly lower prices than fringe competitors (price/quantity differential).  The 
observed price/quantity differential is consistent with the almost common value English auction 
theory developed by Rose and Kagel (2008) in which a cost advantaged bidder is able to reduce 




This is an empirical investigation into the impacts due to principal forming buyer 
collaborations at auctions.  Buyer collaborations are formed when subsets of principal 
purchasers, either jointly or independently, share a common agent to bid on the behalf of the 
principals at auction.  Common agency has a long history and remains pervasive throughout the 
cattle industry today.  When principals hire common agents to conduct transactions, gross 
industry analyses overlook the true nature of competition between the firms.  Therefore, the 
current analysis focuses on a specific auction and the market power exerted by concentrated 
agents, rather than on aggregate industry or broad market data, which could easily mask the 
effects of market power (Sexton 2000).     
Auction owners and sellers of cattle have long been concerned that common agency has 
adverse unilateral effects on prices, especially in already highly concentrated industries.
1  
Furthermore, dominant bidders are typically associated with collaborations and allegedly have 
additional negative price impacts via exclusionary conduct.   
The objective setting for this analysis is a local English auction for cull cows.
2  Most cull 
cows are purchased for slaughter.  Auctions for live cattle in general are characterized as 
common value auctions because the true value is unknown at the time of purchase.  For example,   3
a packer buyer derives a fairly inaccurate estimate of the true slaughter value while observing the 
animal on the hoof at auction.
 3  This is an extremely demanding job in the fast paced 
environment of an auction.     
Cull cow auctions are regularly attended by commission agents, dealers, salaried buyers 
and producers. Agents provide their principals expertise in live animal evaluation and appraisal, 
strategic bidding in an extremely fast-paced environment, as well as market information and 
surveillance when the principal simultaneously competes across multiple auction locations.  The 
bidder of interest is an independent commission order-buying agent representing three beef 
packers and one order-buying firm and is thus a common agent.
4  The common agent observed in 
this analysis purchases nearly 75 percent of the cattle auctioned and is thus a dominant buyer as 
defined from generalizations of antitrust litigation.
5  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
estimates of firm-level concentration are 2160 while concentration at the bidder level is 5667.
6  
On its face, both the dominance of the common agent and common agency raise legitimate 
concerns for sellers at this auction.   
Though common agency necessarily reduces the number of bidders at auction, the issue 
has raised scant attention in antitrust enforcement.  Though there is a large body of theoretical 
literature on auctions, nothing is known about the impacts of common agency and little is known 
about the underlying creation of dominant bidders, especially in the repeated setting (Klemperer 
1999).  The research presented is an econometric analysis of the price impacts due to common 
agency and the presence of a dominant bidder.  The development of the empirical model utilizes 
both related auction theory and antitrust precedent.  As such, this research extends traditional 
auction price analysis to include more game theoretic ideology and incorporates ex ante firm 
level decisions.
7  The product of this work provides regulatory agencies additional insights into   4
the impacts of common agency at auction, as well as develops an empirical model that could be 
used to further assess the net competitive implications common agency when common agency is 
not considered per se illegal.
8 
Antitrust Concerns and Justification for Common Agency  
Buyer collaborations and common agency poses three main anticompetitive concerns 
based primarily from industrial organization theory.  The first is its direct influence upon 
increasing the concentration of bidders.
9  Secondly is the possibility that common agency 
facilitates the creation of a dominant agent which in turn may lead to additional exclusionary 
effects through the exertion of market power.
10  Finally is the potential for the facilitation of 
collusion among the members of the buyer collaboration.
11   
Those who promote the practice of using common agents argue that common agency 
enhances efficiency by reducing transactions costs in order for small to medium sized firms to be 
able to compete with larger rivals (Koch Group 2005; and Telser 1985).  This justification is 
based on the premise that smaller firms would be able to compete more effectively, via 
economies of size, with more efficient firms thus keeping pace with competition rather than 
destroying it.  In the context of mergers the Supreme Court recognized an “against giants” 
defense in Brown Shoe v. United States:  “when concern as to the [Sherman Antitrust] Act's 
breadth was expressed, supporters of the amendments indicated that it would not impede, for 
example, a merger between two small companies to enable the combination to compete more 
effectively with larger competitors dominating the relevant market.”.
12  
Specific to the cattle industry, principals bear the cost of sending employees to auction 
whether they purchase cattle or not.  By hiring an independent commission agent, the agent bears 
the costs of attending the auction and the principal pays nothing if the agent makes no   5
purchases.
13  The collaborators may then be able to reduce their transactions costs depending 
upon the negotiated price of the service.  However, while collaborations of small firms may be 
able to match the competition of larger firms, collaborations of large firms are likely to gain a 
competitive advantage over smaller rivals. 
Scope of Common Agency and Livestock Auctions  
Since 1999, cull cow packers’ report that they have consistently purchased slightly over 
50 percent of their inputs from auction markets from 1999 to 2006 (USDA, GIPSA 2001 – 
2008).
14  There were 1,413 registered auctions that traded $25 billion of livestock in 2006 of 
which an estimated $2.4 billion were cull cow sales (USDA, GIPSA 2008).
15  During 2006, 
3,883 common agents, such as commissioned cattle order-buyers and dealers
16 purchased $4.5 
billion and $21.9 billion (USDA, GIPSA 2008) totaling on average $26.4 billion in livestock.  
From the government statistical reports, it is difficult to assess the pervasiveness of common 
agency specifically at auction.  However, it is quite clear that common agents, in general, 
purchase a significant portion of livestock, and potentially to a greater extent cull cows. 
Common Agency: Statutes, Regulation and Case Precedent  
Packers, commissioned order-buying agents and dealers are registered and bonded per 
the requirements of the 1921 Packers and Stockyards Act, as amended and regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture.  The Act and regulations are enforced by the 
United States Department of Agriculture, the Packers and Stockyards Programs (P&S) which is a 
branch of the Grain Inspection Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA).  Competition 
issues related to packers, commission order-buyers and dealers are also regulated under the 
Packers and Stockyards Act (1921) as amended and enforced by P&S.





It has been reported by GIPSA that: “P&SP investigates all complaints about the use of 
common agents, packers buying livestock for each other, and dealers or order buyers having 
orders from multiple packers for the same type and quality of livestock.” (USDA, GIPSA 
2005).
18  Recently, P&S announced establishing a cull cow competition monitoring program, 
noting that they have already sent one notice to packers indicating a failure to “conduct their 
buying operations independently of and in competition with each other” (USDA, GIPSA 
2009).
19  Though common agency is pervasive in the livestock industry, P&S has only broug
three allegations involving joint buying arrangements (common agency) since 1968. The first
was Swift & Company v. United States in which the act of a dealer purchasing on behalf of, and
in conjunction with, a rival lamb packer buyer was condemned by the court as per se illegal.
20
Later in San Jose Valley Veal when a dealer was purchasing veal calves for multiple packers and 
rival dealers, the court found the collective action as a failure to compete and clearly violated the 
Packers and Stockyards Act.
21   
Most recently in Hennessey, the court found that a commission buyer purchasing on 
behalf of multiple cow packers did not violate the Packers and Stockyards Act when the packer 
principals are not competitors in the relevant market.  The relevant market was arguably 
delineated along “quality” lines.
22  However, other judicial findings related to cattle have not 
allowed product lines to be drawn based solely on quality classifications because quality is not a 
well definable market.
23      
Though typically deferring to GIPSA on most competition issues in the livestock 
industries, jurisdiction over the livestock industry also falls under the purview of the Department 
of Justice under the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890)
24 and Clayton Antitrust Act (1914)
25, as well 
as the Federal Trade Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)
26.  However,   7
there are no recorded Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission cases in any industry 
related to common agency.  
Research Questions 
There are two key competitive implications of common agency addressed in this 
research.  What is the unilateral effect of common agency on auction prices?  And, does the 
presence of a dominant bidder further depress auction prices?  Although exploring whether the 
buying collaborators can result in collusively outside the auction environment is a very important 
question, to maintain focus on the impacts of common agency at auction, collusion is relegated 
for future research. 
The research conducted to answer these key questions proceeds in the following manner.  
First, a review of empirical economic literature related to bidder concentration and dominant 
bidders is conducted.  Data and descriptive statistics are then presented.  Next, the derivation of 
buyer concentration used in this analysis is provided.  Next, the empirical models estimated 
along with statistical considerations are presented followed by the results and conclusions. 
Literature Review Repeated Common Value Auctions 
Bidder Concentration  
The most recent English Auction empirical studies accounting for the impact of bidder 
concentration on winning bids are Nelson (1997) and Bailey, Brorsen and Fawson (1993).  
Nelson analyzed winning bid data from used car auctions in Pennsylvania, while Bailey, Brorsen 
and Fawson analyzed winning bid data from live and video feeder cattle auctions (Oklahoma 
City and Superior Livestock Video Auction).  Both studies verify the negative relationship 
between the level of concentration and prices.  Because both studies calculated concentration ex   8
post, the dynamics of competition impacts of within and across auction predicted from theory 
could not be observed. 
Nelson used two calculations of winning bidder concentration.  The first was the number 
of winning bidders and the second was a ratio of number of units to winning bidders.
27  Nelson 
noted that the bidder concentration measure represents only a proxy for the theoretical 
requirements of potential bidders and that the number of bidders is endogenously determined.   
A novel approach taken by Bailey, Brorsen and Fawson was to include an HHI bidder 
concentration measure.  However, their concentration measure was aggregated sometimes across 
multiple auction sessions.   
Dominant Bidders in Common Value Auctions 
Dominant bidders may form when bidders are asymmetric regarding their true common 
values.  Dominant bidders are expected to simultaneously pay lower prices than fringe rivals thus 
depressing overall market prices.  Theoretical work regarding the formation of and outcomes 
from dominant bidders in second-price and English auctions is limited with mixed results 
depending heavily upon the characteristics of the model (Bikhchandani 1988; Klemperer 1998; 
Levin and Kagel 2005; Rose and Kagel 2008).  Experimental studies also yield mixed results 
(Rose and Levin 2008; Rose and Kagel 2008).  However, empirical studies of the influence of 
dominant buyers in real-world repeated English auctions are less mixed (Nelson 1997; Zulehner 
2009). 
To begin a brief discussion of the theory, let n ≥ 3 risk-neutral bidders in a single period 
or finitely repeated pure common value second-price and English auctions where information is 
complete.  If bidders are symmetric, the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bidding strategies, which 
account for the adverse selection conditional on winning, is symmetric resulting in symmetric   9
outcomes (Milgrom and Weber 1982).  However, when n = 2 and bidders are asymmetric and 
their asymmetry is common knowledge then bidding strategies and outcomes will also be 
asymmetric in both second-price and English auctions.  For instance, if bidder 1 is endowed with 
a cost advantage then they will value the item more than bidder 2.  Therefore, bidder 1 is able to 
bid more aggressively to win.  Aggressive bidding by 1 increases the likelihood and severity of 
the winner’s curse for bidder 2 if they win.  Therefore, bidder 2 must account for the heightened 
winner’s curse by further reducing their bid.  Realizing bidder 2’s predicament, bidder 1 
continues to increase their bid as the winner’s curse for 1 is reduced by bidder 2’s increased 
passivity.  In equilibrium, the advantage bidder bids higher, wins the unit (all units prior to the 
last) more often and is able to pay a lower price than in the symmetric case when they win 
(Bikhchandani 1988; Klemperer 1998).
 28   
In large finitely repeated sealed-bid second-price and English common value auctions 
when n = 2 and where the probability of bidder type is common knowledge, even small degrees 
of incomplete information about bidder type facilitate reputation building (Bikhchandani 
1988).
29  According to the prediction of the theory, when information about a cost-advantaged 
player is asymmetric, the informed bidder is able to buy most, if not all, units at minimal prices.  
Because repeated bidding releases information about the bidder’s type, only if the informed 
bidder is not advantaged will the uniformed player win some units toward the end of the auction.  
Hence, even if bidders are truly symmetric as to their costs, even an information advantage 
manifests itself into a strategic advantage.  The explosive effects of the increased aggressiveness 
of the advantage player and the passivity by the uninformed bidder, not only reduces prices paid 
at auction, but also, results in increased dominance of the informed bidder.     10
However, the degree of the explosive effects found by Bikhchandani and Klemperer has 
been brought into question.  Levin and Kagel (2005) demonstrate that when there is more than 
one disadvantaged bidder (n = 3) the strategic advantage in a single period second-price and 
English common value auctions where information is symmetric
30, the earlier results do not 
generalize.  First, they find that in a second-price auction that the advantage is continually 
dampened as the number of disadvantaged bidders’ increases though the private-value advantage 
remains.  In return, disadvantaged bidders are able to mitigate the heightened winner’s curse 
generated by the advantaged bidder’s aggressive bidding.  In return, the aggressiveness of the 
advantage bidder decreases.  However, because the private-value advantage does not dissipate, 
the advantaged bidder is still expected to win more often at lower prices.  As such, the level of 
dominance is dependent upon the degree of the advantage relative to the number of 
disadvantaged bidders and the degree of advantage corresponds to the degree in the reduction in 
seller revenue.   
Levin and Kagel also demonstrate that in an English auction the strategic advantage still 
results in a higher probability of winning but potentially at higher prices than in the symmetric 
case.  This is due to the disadvantage bidders’ ability to form their optimal bidding strategies by 
relying upon the bidding information released from both the advantaged and disadvantaged 
bidders’ drop-out bids.  However, the authors conclude that one cannot rule out that prices (seller 
surplus) could decrease.
 31  Finally, because the authors did not consider a repeated auction with 
asymmetric information, a generalization of this aspect of Bikhchandani to more than one 
disadvantaged bidders remains in question. 
Experimental work has not substantiated the predictions of Bikhchandani  and Klemperer 
in second-price or English auctions when n ≥ 2 (Rose and Levin 2008; Rose and Kagel 2008).    11
Rose and Levin (2008) conducted an English ‘clock auction’ experiment when n = 2 
inexperienced bidders were randomly and anonymously paired where each other.  Within each 
pairing one bidder was randomly chosen as the advantaged player where identity of the 
advantaged player is common knowledge.  The authors found that the bidding strategies 
employed were simply proportional to their advantage and not explosive as predicted by 
Klemperer.  Seller revenues were higher than expected as all players suffered from the winner’s 
curse.   
Concerned that the inexperience of the bidders may have played a role in the results of 
Rose and Levin, Rose and Kagel (2008) conducted another experiment with n = 4 experienced 
bidders better suited to overcome the adverse selection effect conditional on winning.  The 
authors first prove that there exist explosive risk-neutral Nash equilibrium strategy equilibia 
where a single advantaged bidder always wins over three disadvantaged rivals.  However, the 
experimental results indicated that the advantage remained proportional and not explosive.  The 
authors conclude (citing earlier work by Levin, Kagel and Richard (1999)) that subjects may 
have employed a simple signal averaging rule that does not require bidders to fully incorporate 
the adverse selection effect conditional on winning.  As such, the authors speculate that 
economic agents outside the laboratory would have to employ tools not present in the lab or 
theory or must be sophisticated enough to employ theoretical equilibrium bidding strategies.       
Two traditional empirical studies of winning bid impacts related to dominant buyers in 
real-world English auctions have been mixed using different econometric approaches (Nelson 
1997; Zulehner 2009).  Nelson (1997) did not find a robust relationship to exist while Zulehner 
(2009) found that, as a group, bidders who typically purchase a larger percentage of the market 
paid less than smaller rivals.  In both studies the authors concluded that the price differentials   12
were explained primarily by differences in quality preferences and to a lesser extent on strategic 
bidding.   
Nelson estimated the changes in winning bids based upon the presence of three dominant 
buyers in an attempt to test the predictions of Bikhchandani (1988).  The author employed a 
simple hedonic linear regression technique controlling for the fixed effects of each dominant 
bidder.  The market was narrowly defined as used Caprice sedans cars.   
The overall proportion of units purchased by the largest of the three buyers was less than 
12 percent and each bidder was not consistently dominant.  Interestingly, Nelson previously used 
these data to demonstrate the negative structural shift in prices when the bidding ring was 
operational (Nelson 1993).  The bidding ring, which did not include any of the three dominant 
bidders, purchased nearly 50 percent of the available units during its existence.  If the ring 
members were fully coordinated, the ring would have constituted the dominant bidder.  In 
Nelson (1997), the time period of the bidding ring existed was found to significantly depress 
prices with or without the inclusion of the three smaller dominant bidders.  Including the less 
dominant bidders resulted in one of the three less dominant bidders paying significantly lower 
prices.  However, the author did not find a robust relationship related to the smaller dominant 
bidders when the period of the bidding ring was removed. 
Zulehner (2009) estimated group impacts on winning bids for Austrian dairy cattle.  
Relying on private value auction theory as guidance, the author employed a hedonic Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition technique to identify differences in bidding strategy between groups.
32  
Bidder groups were delineated along two lines; professional traders representing single/multiple 
firms and farmers.  Traders typically purchased more cattle on an individual basis than farmers.  
The actual number of traders or farmers was not identified in the study either within or across   13
auction sessions.  Arguably, the market was not well defined including a wide array of cattle 
ages from calves to mature cows.  Therefore, bidder concentration could not be controlled for.  
Nonetheless, the author found that professional traders as a group paid lower prices on average 
than farmers.   
Winning Bid-Concentration Endogeniety  
Price is a function of the number of bidders in every auction theory model, where the 
number of bidders is typically treated as exogenous.  This presupposes that all bidders are 
committed to bidding from the outset (Levin and Smith 1994).  However, in real-world auctions 
bidders freely enter and exit the bidding process, thus entry and exit are endogenously 
determined (Klemperer 1999; Levin and Smith 1994).  It has been shown by experimentation 
that as bidders evaluate their opportunity costs of entry, declining prices invite entry thus 
increasing the size of the market (Cox, Dinkin and Swarthout 2001).  Therefore, winning bids are 
expected to decrease with increases in concentration indicating that the level of competition is 
decreasing, ceteris paribus.  Concentration is expected to decrease with an increase in prices as 
the increase in price indicates a higher level of competition, ceteris paribus.  As such, 
simultaneity is expected between the two structural variables, concentration and winning bids. 
However, according to Carlton and Perloff (2005, 258), buyer concentration is less likely 
to be endogenous.  Although they do not explain this position, it assumes that the firm is basing 
its input decisions solely on its output market and be taking its input price as given.  Therefore, 
buyer concentration would be a function of the competition in the output market rather than the 
price in the input market. 
 
   14
Data, Descriptive Statistics and Data Limitations 
The data used for the analyses are from an auction firm that sells primarily cull dairy 
cows in the upper Midwest.  The data cover the period from October 4, 1999 through January 26, 
2000.  There are 34 sale dates or auctions during this time frame and 7,722 individual 
observations or sale tickets.  Each sale ticket is for a single animal as each animal is sold 
individually.  A sale ticket has a ticket number, a back tag number to identify the animal, the date 
and time of the sale, breed, weight, and negative physical attributes
33 of the animal (if any).  All 
of this information is publicly observable.  Verification of buyer agency was conducted by 
matching agent signatures on the principal’s final billing invoices.  Buyers representing 
themselves signed their own invoices. 
The auction firm supplied information regarding the type of business engaged in by the 
principals and the principal represented by each bidding agent.  The configuration of principals 
and agents at the 34 auctions is detailed in appendix table A.1 and is summarized as follows:  
Four principal firms owning five meat processing facilities are relevant to the auction. We refer 
to these as Prin1, Prin3, Prin4, Prin5 and Prin7.  Prin3 and Prin4 were plants owned in common.  
Prin5 is the largest packer processor in the region by volume (cows and fed cattle), however, 
Prin1 and the firm that owns Prin3 and 4 are two of three the largest cow packers in the region.  
Additional principal purchasers include, Prin2 who is known to be a cow feeder and commission 
buying firm, Prin9 is an ‘independent’ dealer, Prin6 is a producer/independent’ dealer and Prin8 
is a producer.  Prin6 also provides a market support function for the auction and may send cows 
to packing processors, some of whom may actually be represented by other agents at the market 
analyzed.
34  Another category of principal is “Other,” which included one-time or infrequent 
purchasers
35.     15
There is only one commissioned order-buying agent who bid on behalf of three 
processing plants (Prin1, Prin3 and Prin4) and the one feedlot/order-buying firm (Prin2).  No 
other bidders were known to represent multiple principals.  The ultimate destination of the cattle 
purchased for Prin2 is unknown, though it is suspected that most of the cattle were delivered to 
the third of the three largest packers in the region.  The other two processors (Prin5 and Prin7) 
each sent a salaried agent to the auctions.  All other buyers represented themselves at these 
auctions (Prin6, Prin8, Prin9 and Other).   
Appendix table A.1 also reports the number of head, prices paid and average live weight 
purchased by each principal over the 34 auctions.  The common commission order-buyer was 
also the dominant buyer (DOM) purchasing 73.72 percent of the total available units for sale.
36  
All other bidders purchased the remaining 26.28 percent and are collectively referred to as the 
fringe (FRNG).  From the principal’s perspective, no principal purchased more than 23.98 
percent of the total units sold and no single principal held a dominant position in the market.  
Interestingly, DOM managed to purchase nearly identical numbers of cattle for Prin1, 2 and 3 
during the period of study, roughly 24 percent each.  DOM represented Prin4 only from October 
4 through November 8; no additional cattle were purchased for that plant at later auctions.  
The average price of all 7,722 animals sold was $33.71/cwt, and the average live weight 
was 1,283.18 pounds (appendix table A.1).  DOM's average winning bid was $1.23/cwt (3.6 
percent) below the average winning bid.  FRNG paid on average $3.41/cwt (10.11 percent) 
above the average winning bid which constituted a spread between the two of $4.64/cwt.  The 
average weight of cows purchased by DOM was 1,257.74 pounds, while the average weight of 
animals purchased by FRNG was 1,354.56 pounds.  There are most likely preferences over 
characteristics since Prin5 purchased the heaviest cull cows (1,602.64 pounds) at the highest   16
average price ($40.77/cwt), while Prin1 purchased the lightest animals (1,095.57 pounds) at an 
average price of ($26.61/cwt).  These price-weight relationships are expected, because heavier 
cows tend to have fewer negative attributes and yield not only more red meat, but also higher 
quality cuts of meat which is a primary interest for processors.  On the other hand, extremely 
light weight cows tend to be nearly un-merchantable. 
Holstein dairy cows constituted the majority (75.33 percent) of cull cows sold and on 
average they sold for $33.44/cwt.  Beef breeds, such as Herefords, made up about 21.39 percent 
of the animals sold at the auctions, for an average price of $34.82/cwt.  Beef breeds are more 
valuable because they tend to yield more red meat on a percentage basis than Holsteins and also 
tend to be more efficient converters of feed to meat.  As a result, beef breeds commanded a 
higher per unit price on average.  Every principal purchased both dairy and beef cows.  However, 
the proportions of Holsteins by principals were variable, ranging from 56.95 percent to 93.29 
percent, indicating preference differentials.   
The average price of cull cows with no negative attributes was $35.05/cwt, as compared 
to the average price of cull cows with negative attributes of $25.66/cwt.
 37  All principals 
purchased cull cows with and without negative attributes.  However, preferences proved to be 
important as Prin1 was the only principal to purchase a high percentage of cull cows with 
noticeable defects relative to total purchases (42.41 percent).  This partially explains in aggregate 
the lower average price paid by DOM, because a significant percentage of DOM’s purchases 
with negative attributes were for Prin1 (25.28 percent).  All other principals tended to purchase 
cull cows with a lower incidence of negative attributes – the proportion of purchases with no 
negative attributes ranged from 88.38 percent to 97.63 percent of their total purchases.    17
Consequently, characteristic preferences matter and must be accounted for in the empirical work 
which follows. 
Limitations of the Data 
Common to empirical work of real-world oral ascending auctions, there are constraints in 
collecting important data due to logistics and the proprietary nature of some information.  The 
three biggest data limitations are the lack of recorded agent bids, buy-orders held by each agent 
and the profit-loss performance of each agent or principal.
 38,39  Without tracking buyer entry and 
exit from the bidding process, comparing final bids against the buy-order and subsequent profit-
loss statement, surplus effects of strategic bidding behavior such as aggressive/passive bidding 
cannot be directly identified.  Therefore, any estimated price differentials between the dominant 
bidder and fringe bidders are relative without controlling for potential differences in principal 
marginal value schedules.  Finally, welfare estimates of any kind cannot be estimated unless 
price impacts can be directly compared to a theoretical competitive price.  These are common 
limitations in real-world auction analyses, thus any antitrust implications derived from this 
analysis can only be considered preliminary. 
Measuring Bidder Concentration in Repeated Auctions 
The first step in analyzing the competitive impacts stemming from competitor conduct, 
the relevant market must first be defined.  The definition of the relevant market contains two 
attributes; product and geographic.
40  Once the relevant market is defined, the relevant 
competitors are identified and concentration measures are calculated.   
Properly defining the relevant market is probably the most contentious and costly issue in 
antitrust litigation and “although market definitions, once resolved, often are blindly applied as a 
surrogate for more sensitive market analysis, lawyers and courts continue to rely on market   18
definitions as the key to disposing of market power issues.” (Sullivan and Grimes 2000, 60).  
However, a proper analysis required to define the relevant market is far beyond the scope of this 
analysis.  For the purposes of this analysis, the relevant market is arguably defined as a local cull 
cow auction.
41  We base this assertion on the fact that bidders in the auction, though apparently 
preferring different types of cattle, significantly overlapped in their purchases based on weight 
(figure B.1).
42 
Cumulative Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Static ex post concentration calculations used in previous empirical work suffers from not 
incorporating historical strategic information.  In a time-series analysis of auction competition, 
non-collusive bidders are unable to incorporate information regarding overall concentration ex 
ante, but rather observe the development of concentration simultaneously as competition plays 
itself out.  From the theory of repeated auctions discussed, observed changes in bidder 
concentration are a result of past strategic decisions and historical information is used by bidders 
in making future strategic decisions.  Bidders signal their competitiveness not only by entering or 
exiting the bidding process within each unit sold, but more credibly by winning or losing bids 
across units sold.  In order for concentration to provide information about the relevant history of 
play for purposes of updating, capturing the dynamics of the changing competition, the 
concentration measure must accumulate information.  Given the likelihood for changes in buy-
orders between auction sessions, the immediate history of play should be carried over from the 
previous auction session as buyers take a ‘wait and see’ position which is quickly forgotten as 
the new game begins.  The timing of each competitors winning bid is not expected to be 
consistent outside a repetitive turn-taking scheme and when bidders have clear preferences but 
the heterogeneous units are randomly ordered.
43  In order to correct for the lack strategic information provided by ex post concentration calculations, the following concentration measure 
is proposed and tested.   
As noted earlier, one of the data limitations noted is that data collected does not contain 
the number of bidders per unit.  Suffering from this limitation does not preclude developing at 
least a proxy for measuring changes in competition across units.  Though individual auctions 
may be thought of as Bertrand pricing, our proposed concentration measure is based on the HHI, 
appropriate for Cournot oligopsony firm behavior.
44   
Packer principals make production decisions based on output orders leaving input pricing 
decisions to be managed across multiple auction locations.  Packer principals develop buy-orders 
for agents based on their estimated optimal input price.  The buy-order provides the agent with a 
schedule of the principal’s pricing demands for discrete classifications of cattle.  The prices 
observed at auction represent the true realization of competition.  Thus, we assert that if the 
impacts of concentration at the firm level can be disaggregated across auctions then the HHI is 
an applicable, though a second best, indicator of changes in competition at a single auction 
location within and across auction sessions.   
From the previous arguments, the concentration measure developed here is a Cumulative 







= ∑ ≡ sum of the squared i
th = (1,n) 
bidders market shares (si) up to the q
th = (1,Q) unit sold in the auction session. Market share is 
simply measured by a buyer’s proportion of winning bids during an auction and is continually 
updated throughout the sale.  The boundaries are the same as the HHI where a value of 10,000 
represents a monopoly. As currently calculated, the CHHI is repeated for each auction session.  
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For instance, the CHHI calculated for Monday’s sale is separate from the following 
Wednesday’s sale. 
There are two shortcomings to using this concentration calculation in its current form.  
First, it considers each auction session as a discrete auction with no possibility for information 
spillover (adaptive learning) to the next auction.  The second is that the CHHI as given calculates 
highly unstable levels of concentration early in an auction converging to more stable levels as the 
auction progresses.     
Since the concentration information conveyed from each auction is not likely considered 
separate and independent of the previous auction, the following procedure is devised to reduce 
the uninformative wide swings in the CHHI calculation.  A graphical example of the procedure is 
depicted in appendix figure B.2.  Ad hoc as the procedure may seem, the calculated transition 
periods did not appear to be sensitive to choosing a five-, ten- or fifteen-period moving average 
standard deviation.  Therefore, the transition period at the beginning of each auction was 
determined by the mean ten-period moving average standard deviation of the CHHI across all 
auction sessions and is then compared to each within-auction session ten-period moving standard 
deviation of the CHHI.
  The first unit where the within-auction session CHHI ten-period moving 
average standard deviation equals the overall mean of the ten-period moving average standard 
deviation marks the transition length for that auction session.  The transition length averaged 34 
observations or about 15 percent of the units sold at an average auction and 22 observations or 
about 10 percent for the average auction for the winning bidder concentration and principal 
concentration calculations.   
Once the transition period length was determined, an adjusted CHHI is calculated.  
Within the transition period the CHHI is calculated by giving progressively greater weights to   21
the current auction’s CHHI, while giving progressively less weight to the previous auction’s 
overall CHHI.
 45  After the transition period is complete, full weight is given to the current 
auction session’s CHHI.  The converged value of the CHHI at the end of the auction session is 
then used in the calculation of the next auction session’s transition period CHHI, and so on.  
Therefore, the CHHI calculation not only allows for within auction variation, but also bridges the 
information gap in concentration used by the agent buyers.
46 
Appendix figure B.3 depicts the progression of the adjusted CHHI for winning bidder 
concentration with common agency (CHHIA) and represented principal concentration (CHHIP) 
across three example auctions from the data.  On average, the CHHIP is 2,160 and the CHHIA is 
5,667.
47  The CHHIP is less than CHHIA because the principal concentration presupposes that 
principal buyers are independently represented at auction.  Common agency more than doubled 
the derived HHI.  The significant increase is primarily due to the fact that the common agent is 
the dominant agent. When bidder concentration is calculated at the principal level, any 
measurable difference in price impacts between the two measures are due to the common agent’s 
influence over the apportionment and pricing within the collaboration of principals.  
Empirical Model Development, Hypotheses and Estimation Procedures  
In this section, structural estimation issues are addressed, empirical models developed 
and statistical hypotheses stated.  Finally, estimation procedures and data issues are discussed. A 
hedonic system of simultaneous equations, which accounts for simultaneity of price and 
concentration, bidder concentration and dominance, is estimated.  From the results of 
econometric analysis, direct evidence of the unilateral effects of common agency and dominance 
are provided.   Also, weak evidence of exclusionary rivalry between the common agent and rival 
bidders is demonstrated through t-tests and graphical analysis.    22
Structural Estimation of English Auction Data 
We would prefer to impose theoretical bidding structure in analyzing the data.  Imposing 
a theoretical structure on an auction model based on optimal bidding behavior allows for 
econometric comparisons of market outcomes to predicted equilibrium prices (Paarsch and Hong 
2006).  In essence, the modeler estimates the demand for each bidder from estimates of the 
distribution of private signals.  From this information the modeler is able to calculate the 
competitive price, given the number of bidders and their theoretical optimal strategy, and 
compare these estimates to the observed price.  However, the extremely sophisticated nature of 
information in real-world auctions makes it difficult to convincingly impose a unique structural 
auction model in an econometric way.  Furthermore, structural methods have yet to adequately 
identify the unknown stochastic nature of common value auctions, especially in English auctions 
(Paarsch and Hong 2006; Athey and Haile 2002; Laffont and Vuong 1996).   As such, no 
theoretical strategic structure is imposed on the current econometric model and all results will be 
relative in nature, that is, bidder price differentials are estimated rather than comparing overall 
auction prices to the predicted competitive equilibrium based on the mechanism design.  
Unilateral Effects of Common Agents 
   If the econometrician is able to observe data generated prior to and after the formation of 
the common agent, an event analysis can be employed.  However, when agency contracts such as 
the one analyzed in this study have been in existence for many years, gathering the data for an 
event analysis is prohibitive.  Therefore, estimates of the impact of common agency must be 
derived by extrapolation from the estimates of the impacts of concentration within the data 
series.  
   23
Separation of Unilateral and Exclusionary/Strategic Effects  
Because the common agent is also the dominant agent and since winning bids and 
concentration are endogenous, there is a potential for simultaneity between the unilateral effects 
of common agency and dominance.  Primarily due to the cumulative nature of the CHHIA, this 
problem is alleviated and is justified as follows.   
First, common agency is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for dominance.  For 
instance, a group of small principals seeking increased efficiencies may hire a common agent 
who in turn purchases an equal share of the market.  Also, a principal buyer may independently 
purchase the largest portion of the market if they are geographically advantaged over equally 
sized rivals.  Only when symmetric capacity constrained principals combine their purchase 
orders with a common agent will common agency necessarily result in a dominant agent.  
Because firms are highly unlikely to be perfectly symmetric in real-world markets, it also highly 
unlikely that the unilateral effects of common agency and the exclusionary/strategic effects of a 
dominant bidder are perfectly correlated in this analysis.   
Secondly, the CHHIA is independent of which bidder purchases the item.  However, it is 
noted that as the size of the dominant bidder increases, the degree of correlation between 
dominance and common agency is expected to increase.   
Identifying Exclusionary from Strategic Effects 
From the data separating exclusionary conduct from strategic advantage cannot be 
accomplished.  Both dominant firm and auction theory agree that the initial condition to establish 
dominance is the presence of an advantaged player.  The fear by antitrust authorities is that a 
dominant buyer may be in position to credibly extend their market power by engaging in 
exclusionary conduct.  Exclusionary conduct in auctions would be predatory pricing designed to   24
“raise rivals costs”.
 48  By credibly “raising rivals costs”, the disadvantaged firm either reduces 
their presence or exits the market entirely.  Interestingly, this sounds exactly like the explanation 
of the explosive effects of advantaged bidders in common value auctions.  Therefore, it does not 
appear that evidence of aggressive bidding is actually an extension of market power in auctions, 
but could simply be the result of the optimal strategy for an advantaged bidder.   
Cattle Characteristics 
  Hedonic price functions are based on the premise that within-product heterogeneity 
exists, as is the case for the cull cows in this study.  Mintert, Schroeder and Brazel (1990) is the 
only previous study known to the author which specifically addressed input characteristic 
impacts on demand for cull cows in an auction setting.  Breed, weight and poor health attributes 
were included in the model resulting in a net negative price impact for dairy breeds and negative 
price impacts for weight and poor health. 
These authors also included an estimate of dressing percentage as an independent 
variable.  However, estimates of an unobservable attribute, such as dressing percentage, rely on 
observables such as weight, frame size, flesh condition and muscling to develop the proxy.  
Estimates regarding dressing percentage and weight suffered from multicollinearity because 
“biological entities are by nature a conglomeration of many individual, yet dependent, 
characteristics.” (Coatney, Menkhaus and Schmitz 1996). 
Declining Price Anomaly 
Before the introduction of the declining price anomaly in the economics literature for 
homogenous goods put forth by Ashenfelter (1989) and formalized by McAfee and Vincent 
(1993) and Buccola (1982) noted that in livestock auctions the same anomaly was observed for 
quality-corrected prices.  Buccola attributed the decline to risk-averse buyers who are   25
minimizing their risk of failing to make their required purchases.  These types of buyers are 
willing to bid their maximum willingness to pay early in the sale.  Thus, buyers are satiated in 
order of their risk aversion resulting in the downward trend in quality adjusted prices.  As such, 
we should expect to observe buyers, potentially with large orders, filling the majority of those 
orders early in the sale at higher prices.   
Empirical Model Development 
The data in this study are a time-series of repeated unit auctions, with intermittent breaks 
across auction sessions.
49  To account for simultaneity between selling prices and concentration, 
two sets of systems of linear equations are estimated to explain 1) how selling price (SP) is 
impacted by the dominant bidder (DOM) and agent concentration (CHHIA).   
Both the price and CHHIA equations contain cattle characteristics as regressors, to 
account for the private marginal value products related to these characteristics.  The cattle 
characteristics included in the data are Holstein cows (HC), whether a cow has a negative 
attribute (Neg) and the weight of the cow (Wt).  If a characteristic is more (less) preferred by 
principals and the agent accurately carries accounts for that preference, we would expect positive 
(negative) impacts on the concentration measures.   
The cattle characteristic variables are limited by the data and are by no means complete.  
Frame, flesh condition and muscling are important observable characteristics for buyers to 
estimate value related to both red meat yield and further production capability.  However, the 
cubic weight to price relationship is assumed to be a good proxy in the price equation because 
weight is naturally a function of these missing characteristics (Coatney, Menkhaus and Schmitz 
1996).  A squared weight relationship is assumed in the concentration equations, due to fewer 
principals desiring cattle at the extremes (appendix figure B.1).     26
Lagged endogenous variables are included in each equation to capture concentration and 
price dynamics related to bidders learning the degree of competition and learning about rival 
valuations.  Players in repeated games are adaptive learners (Roth and Erev 1995 and Camerer 
2003, 469-470).  Camerer concludes that there is ‘strategic teaching’ between players.  Gavin 
and Kagel (2002) analyze simple learning processes of bidders in repeated common value 
auctions.  Referring to 1.B.1, market dynamics in cattle auctions are constantly in flux.  
Therefore, past price and concentration information is assimilated into the bidder’s current 
strategic choices. 
Looking back at the development of the CHHI, it was simply noted that buyers 
incorporate the information about the level of concentration across auctions to adapt to the weak 
information provided from purchases of early units.  What was argued is that bidders maintain a 
history of play from the previous auction and use this information to make strategic decisions for 
units early in the next auction.  The appropriate lag structure of concentration is one period as the 
measure already includes the history of play up to the point immediately prior to the current unit 
and is represented in the models as L1CHHIA.  
Determining the appropriate lag structure for price is problematic.  The reason being is 
that because cattle are heterogeneous, it would be difficult to find a lag structure that matches the 
current animal with the most recent animal of “similar” characteristics.  Even if such an animal 
can be found by the researcher, it is uncertain whether the bidders would consider the same 
animal as sufficiently similar.  Therefore, price is lagged only one period to at least incorporate 
some learning dynamics and is represented in the model as L1SP. 
Finally, a within auction trend variable (ST) is also used to test for the ‘declining price 
anomaly’ which relies on the model’s ability to adequately control for heterogeneity.  Also, a   27
trend variable (T), measured by the unit sold over the entire series of auctions, is included in 
each equation to capture outside influences not explained over all auction periods. 
A simple description of the models estimated are as follows: the expected sign of the 
estimated coefficient associated with each variable is in parentheses.  Descriptive statistics of for 
each variable are provided in appendix table A.2. 
Estimating the Influence of the Dominate Common Agent  
SP = f(CHHIA, DOM, L1SP, HC, Neg, Wt, Wt
2, Wt
3, ST, T)                                                     (1) 
         (-)         (-),      (+),   (-),   (-),   (+),  (-),  (+),  (-),  (-) 
where: 
CHHIA = f(SP, L1CHHIA, HC, Neg, Wt, Wt
2, ST, T)                                                                (2) 
              (-),        (+),        (?),   (?),  (?),  (?),  (-), (?) 
where:  
•  SP = Selling Price in $/cwt; 
•  CHHIA = Cumulative Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of winning bidders for the 
agents/principals present at sale; 
•  DOM = Dominant bidder dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if the common agency 
(dominant bidder) buys and 0 otherwise; 
•  HC = Holstein cow dummy variable, non-Holstein = 0; 
•  Neg = Negative attribute dummy variable, non-negative = 0; 
•  Wt = Animal weight in pounds; 
•  ST = Within sale trend Î order of units sold per auction. 
•  T = Overall trend observation, 1 – 7,722; 
•  L1SP = Predicted Selling Price lagged one unit sold in $/cwt; 
•  L1CHHIA = Predicted Cumulative Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of winning bidders for 
the agents/buyers lagged one unit sold; 




Three primary statistical hypotheses are tested: 
The impact on price relative to the dominant agent, 
1) Ho: (SP|Dom=1) – (SP|Dom=0) = 0  
     Ha: (SP|Dom=1) – (SP|Dom=0) ≠ 0 regardless of concentration measure utilized.   28
The direct impact on price due to changes in bidder concentration, 
2) Ho: ∂SP/∂ CHHIA = 0  
     Ha: ∂SP/∂ CHHIA ≠ 0.   
Estimation Considerations of Simultaneous Equations 
To test the appropriateness of various system-estimation procedures, the Hausman’s 
specification test is used to test a hypotheses regarding inconsistency of the estimators 
(Hausman, 1978).  Hausman’s specification test, or m-statistic, can be used to determine if it is 
necessary to use an instrumental variables method.  Hausman’s m-statistic can also be used to 
compare 2SLS with 3SLS for a class of estimators where 3SLS is asymptotically efficient 
(similarly for OLS and SUR) (SAS Institution chpt. 14: pp. 786-787).   
Autocorrelation may originate from the nature of the data in that the price of the previous 
animal sold may have some residual impact on the price of the current animal being sold.  If, 
however, buyers update their bids on a per unit basis then severe autocorrelation is not expected 
in the price equation.  Severe autocorrelation is expected in the concentration equations.  Under-
prediction of the concentration variables in one period is expected to be followed by an under-
prediction in the next, due to the cumulative nature of the calculation of the concentration 
variables.   
Inclusion of lagged dependent variables in each structural equation in the presence of 
autocorrelation results in inconsistent estimators including that of the autocorrelation coefficient.  
An alternative to using lagged dependent variables is to lag estimated instrumental variables 
(Greene 1993, 609).  This results in lagged predicted endogenous variables L1SP and L1CHHIA.  
The SP and CHHIA variables are first predicted from the reduced form equations in which each 
endogenous variable is regressed against the full set of instruments which include all exogenous   29
variables in the system; all exogenous variables are lagged once, and all endogenous variables 
lagged once and twice.
50  This instrumental variable approach is a variation suggested by Sargan 
(1961).  Fair (1970) suggested reducing the number of instruments if the number of instruments 
exceeds the number of observations.  With over 7000 observations and only 17 instruments, this 
did not appear to be of concern for this analysis.  The predicted values are then lagged and used 
as instruments in further stages of either 2SLS or 3SLS (depending on the results of Hausman’s 
specification test). 
The estimated system of equations meets the rank and order conditions for identification, 
as each equation contains at least its own predetermined variable (Greene 2003, 393).  The price 
equation is exactly identified, while the concentration equation is overidentified.
51  The validity 
of the restrictions placed on the concentration equation will be tested by a statistical procedure 
developed by Basmann (1960) where “the null hypothesis is that the predetermined variables not 
appearing in any equation have zero coefficients” (SAS Institute 2009, chapt. 14, 1089-90).
 52   
After testing for suspected autocorrelation, either the second- or third-stage equations will be 
estimated using the conditional least squares method to adjust for a first order autoregressive 
process (SAS Institute 2009, chapt. 14, 794-799).   
Finally, multicollinearity between the DOM and CHHIA was not detected by means of 
either the variance inflation factor or condition indices.  The variance inflation factor equaled 
1.10 for DOM and 1.06 for CHHIA, where values of over 5 are considered sufficiently correlated 
with other variables in the model to warrant suspicion of severe multicollinearity (Marquardt and 
Snee 1975).  Therefore, the price effects of dominance and concentration are statistically 
identified. 
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Results  
The results for equations (1) and (2) are as expected and are reported in appendix table 
A.3.  The alternative model specifications, selling price with CHHIA, were estimated using 
3SLS and 2SLS, based on the results of the Hausman m-statistic.  By the results of the Basmann 
statistic, the restrictions on the concentration equation appear to be valid.  Because lagged 
endogenous variables are instrumented, the Durbin-Watson statistic is an appropriate test statistic 
for autocorrelation.  The Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that first-order autocorrelation was an 
issue for the concentration equations.  However, autocorrelation may not have been a serious 
issue regarding the price equations given the indeterminacy of the Durbin-Watson statistic.  This 
result suggests that: 1) buyers rely on individual estimates of value and 2) the single lag in price 
was likely enough. 
Hedonics, Declining Price Anomaly and Market Definition 
As expected, cattle characteristics are important determinants of price and exhibit the 
expected relationships with price.  Cattle traits also are important determinants of agent and 
principal concentrations and the respective coefficients have the same signs in both price 
equations, suggesting preferences exist among principals.  The Durbin-Watson statistic and the 
estimated rho did not indicate that a first-order positive autocorrelation was a serious issue in the 
price equation.
53  This result suggests agent bidders primarily value each randomly ordered 
animal separately.  This is to be expected when visual appraisal is crucial in determining each 
animal’s expected value.  In so far as possible, accounting for the cattle characteristics created a 
fairly homogenous product from which to evaluate the impacts of the dominant bidder and 
winning-bid structure variables on price.  Furthermore, by adequately accounting for the cattle 
characteristics, the estimation procedure treats each unit sold as a series of independent repeated   31
unit sales, leaving strategic behavior to be accounted for in other variables such as the CHHIA 
and DOM variables. 
  Regardless of the model estimated in this study, the declining price anomaly was 
observed.  In previous theoretical and empirical work, the anomaly was found when the objects 
were considered homogenous lending further support that the product market is adequately 
defined.  It has been demonstrated that the relevant quality characteristics have been adequately 
held constant; therefore the result lends further support to previous theoretical and empirical 
findings related to this anomaly.  Regardless of the noncooperative or cooperative relationship 
between the dominant agent and fringe, some hedging of risk aversion may remain. 
Bidder Concentration and Price Endogeneity  
Similar to past econometric results relating to the theory of the firm, selling price and 
concentration in these results are inversely related – lower (higher) prices are a result of higher 
(lower) winning-bidder concentration.  Results from the Hausman m-statistic further support an 
endogeneity issue between concentration and the prevailing auction price.  Therefore, at least in 
an auction setting, these results do not support the assertion made by Carlton and Perloff (2005) 
that endogeneity is not to be expected when analyzing the structural impacts of buyer 
concentration. 
Unilateral Impacts CHHIA v. Ex Post HHIA  
For comparison purposes equation (1) was re-estimated using the ex post calculated 
HHIA following Bailey, Brorsen and Fawson (1993) and the CHHIA as regressors in a single 
equation ignoring the endogeneity of concentration and price.  The results are provided in 
appendix table A.4.     32
The fit of the price equation in the system was not improved by single equation 
estimation.  Serial correlation in the single equation approach is on par with the systems 
approach.  Signs and significance remain unchanged for all variables in the model.  However, by 
ignoring endogeneity and following the ex post approach; DOM’s price impact is reduced from -
$4.49/cwt to -$2.66.  Concentration impacts are reduced from -0. 95 per 1000 increase in the 
system CHHIA to a -0.30 per 1000 increase in the HHIA.  By ignoring endogeneity but 
accounting for the informational updating of the CHHIA, the price impacts by DOM and 
concentration remain basically unchanged.  Inclusion of the CHHIA in the equation provided 
basically no additional explanatory power over the HHIA. 
Interpretation of these results indicates that the Ordinary Least Squares estimators suffer 
from simultaneity bias.  By ignoring endogeneity significantly impacts the magnitude of the 
coefficients of interest, reducing the estimated coefficient on DOM by less than 50 percent and 
the coefficient on CHHIA by over 60 percent.  However, an important result of alternative 
estimation procedure is that the negative price impact by DOM and concentration is robust. 
Dominant Agent Price Impacts 
The common agent (DOM) contributed to a significant reduction in the average winning 
bid price of $4.49/cwt.  This result is similar in magnitude to the average price differential of 
$4.64/cwt previously reported.  The consistency of these results suggests that both dominant and 
fringe groups purchased cattle displaying similar characteristics.  In other word, controlling for 
cattle characteristics did not a play significant role in the resulting price differential.  Therefore, 
the product market is appropriately broadly defined as cull cows.   
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Agent Rivalry and Exclusion 
Appendix figure B.4 demonstrates the price impacts when Prin5 (packer) and the Prin6 
(market support bidder) challenged the dominant buyer for market share in auctions 10 and 23.  
Prin5 significantly increased their market share from an average of roughly 8 percent to 22 
percent in auction 23.  Prin6 also significantly increased their market share from an average of 
roughly 8 percent to 23 percent in auction 10.  In both instances, DOM significantly lost market 
share. 
Only in auction 23 when Prin5 significantly deviate from their average market share did 
prices significantly increase.  The large packer processor apparently was required to pay for its 
deviation in market share.  However, Prin6 did not experience the apparent rivalry as did the 
large processor.  The statistical results of price and market share by bidder and principal 
purchaser are provided in appendix table A.5.  The statistical results do not support a conclusion 
that the significant price change in auction 23 versus all other auctions was due to significant 
increases in higher-valued cattle characteristics (LW), a trait which Prin5 apparently prefers 
(refer to appendix figure B.1).   
It is only speculative whether DOM was the bidder who engaged in 
exclusionary/strategic conduct fearing an increased foot-hold by the large processor or instituted 
a grim strategy to solicit an agreement of cooperation.  Without bidding data and further 
evidence, these observationally-equivalent strategies cannot be confirmed.  In either event, Prin5 
resumed their longer run market share position in the next sale. 
In regards to Prin6, we would not expect there to be a significant price differential when 
the market support bidder increased market share.  This is because their role is to simply support 
the market, not take away market share.
54  It could be the case that DOM simply demanded   34
fewer units for their principals on that particular day and the market support person was able to 
advantage of the situation without experiencing rivalry from DOM. 
Market Support  
  As noted in the data section, Prin6 allegedly provided market support and is an ally of the 
marketing institution.  However, the effectiveness of market support is difficult to estimate.  The 
dominant buyer was able to pay prices significantly below Prin6 (basis of comparison) for Prin1, 
Prin3 and Prin4, but paid higher prices for Prin2, ceteris paribus.  These deviations may depend 
upon the intended use of similar animals resulting in heterogeneous values of marginal products; 
it is unlikely Prin6 was able to obtain competitive dealer bids from principals who were 
represented at the auction.  If the results from appendix figure B.3 are indicative of the market 
support bidder’s role, it is merely to maintain a floor on prices rather than to aggressively 
maintain average sale prices, which could not be accomplish without buy-orders from rivals 
principals. 
Summary of Collaboration Benefits 
Assuming increases in concentration are linear given the similar magnitudes of the two 
concentration measures, increases in concentration from CHHIP equaling 2,160 to the CHHIA 
equaling 5,667 on average constitutes a 3,507 increase in concentration.
55  A decrease in average 
price of roughly $1.00/cwt per 1000 increase in concentration would indicate that increasing 
concentration by common agency alone decreased price by $3.51/cwt (again, nearly equal to the 
auctioneer’s alleged average price impact resulting from the common agency).  This would 
constitute an unobserved up-front aggregate cost savings of $250,964.46 for the collaboration 
over the four month course of the study (calculated over only the dominant agent’s purchases).  
Though increases in concentration reduce all principal purchasers’ costs, the lion’s share of the   35
award goes to the largest purchasers.  Additionally, comparing further price reductions by the 
dominant agent alone reduces the aggregate cost of cattle for the collaboration by $321,498.09 
(calculated over only the dominant agent’s purchases). 
Conclusions and Implications for Antitrust  
Buyer collaborations may have significant impacts on prices paid at auction.  The 
primary purpose of this study was to estimate the unilateral price impacts of common agency and 
the exclusionary/strategic price impacts associated with the presence of a dominant bidder.  As a 
whole, the empirical findings support the competition concerns raised by market participants 
regarding common agency and dominant bidders.  Clearly the increased concentration, due to 
common agency and the negative impacts of a dominant bidder, significantly reduced average 
prices paid to sellers.  In return, the collaboration was able to gain substantial benefits from 
hiring a common agent.     
The auction market’s attempts to combat the reduced competition are not completely 
ineffective.  The market support provided a credible reservation price, though clearly less than 
the price that would have been paid if collaborators represented themselves at auction. 
The amount of information utilized seemed to adequately define the relevant market; 
evidenced by an indeterminate omitted variable problem in the price equation and the 
observation of the declining price anomaly typically associated with homogeneous units.  Given 
the definition of the relevant market in this study, the CHHIA is defensible on both theoretical 
and institutional grounds and appears to respond well to estimation in a more structural 
paradigm.   
Finally, efficiency has been noted as a pro-competitive benefit of common agency, as 
well as a cause for creating a dominant bidder.  If common agency is not considered per se   36
illegal, antitrust authorities must take a rule of reason approach, weighing the pro and 
anticompetitive impacts to determine the net impact on competition.   
From the available data, we can only speculate as to the degree of efficiency.  DOM 
earned an estimated $35,802 over the course of four months at this particular auction location 
(appendix table A.1).  This translates, for example, into roughly $51,000 per annum paid by 
Prin2 alone.  Since commission agents do not receive benefits, such as health and retirement 
benefits or bonuses from their principals, hiring a commission agent may be more cost effective 
than hiring an employee whose base salary alone is approximately $50,000 per annum.   
Interestingly in an auction setting, the theories developed by, if there are efficiencies in 
hiring common agents, efficiency gains do not result in higher, but lower prices paid at auction 
(Rose and Kagel (2008); Klemperer 1998; Bikhchandani 1988).   Though Rose and Kagel (2008) 
failed to find the explosive effects of advantaged bidders in a laboratory setting the result here 
affirms that the author’s speculation that economic agents outside the laboratory would have to 
employ tools not present in the lab or theory or must be sophisticated enough to employ 
theoretical equilibrium bidding strategies may be justified.  This brings a new paradigm for 
antitrust regulation to consider when evaluating an efficiency defense for principals hiring a 
common agent, whether independently or jointly, in auctions.   
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Appendix A: Tables of Statistical Results 
  
 
Table A.1:  Total Number of Head, Average Prices and Average Live Weights Purchased 
by Principals and Common Agent (DOM) 
 










* 1832  26.61  1095.57  10035.42 
Prin2
* 1851  36.29  1388.44  12850.01 
Prin3
* 1852  34.52  1294.10  11983.37 
Prin4
* 158  32.32  1180.57  932.65 
Prin5 627  40.77  1602.64  -- 
Prin6 610  34.82  1256.38  -- 
Prin7 169  35.96  1315.75  -- 
Prin8 164  36.83  1220.61  -- 
Prin9 149  36.41  1188.56  -- 
Other 310  35.44  1217.81  -- 
Total/Average 7722 33.71  1283.18  35801.45 
DOM 5693  32.49  1257.74  35801.56 
FRNG 2029  37.13  1354.56   
Mean/Std Collab. 
MS 
33.3/5.5**      
Mean/Std FRNG MS  16.7/13.4**       
*Collaboration of principals represented by common agent- Principal 1 and 4 are actually 
plants owned by the same processor. 
1Estimated commission earnings based on an 
industry average.  
**F-Test results - Std Collaboration MS is significantly smaller than Std FRNG at  
α = .01 
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SP 33.71  5.85  5  50   
CHHIA 5677.20  785.12 3735.15  8383.74     
CHHIP 2160.01  280.20  1551.01  3956.69     
DOM        5693  73.72 
HC         5817  75.33 
Neg        1103  14.28 
Wt 1283.18  220.77  480  2160    










L1CHHIA 5677.26 782.11  3769.52  8358.74     
L1CHHIP 2159.97 274.80  1545.25  3923.37       39










Intercept  19.63* 1030.79* 
(1.78) (71.66) 
SP   -22.17* 
 (0.77) 










HC  -1.86* -42.71* 
(0.09) (4.17) 
NEG  -6.89* -144.92* 
(0.11) (7.12) 
WT  0.03* 0.48* 
(0.004) (0.06) 
WT
2  -0.00001* -0.0001* 
(2.90E-6) (0.00002) 
WT
3  1.93E-9*  
(7.31E-10)  
ST  -0.002* -.06 
(0.001) (.10) 








2   0.53  0.97 





3 34.49**  10238** 
* Significantly different from zero, α = 0.01.  
** Significantly different, α = 0.01.   
1,2 Rho and Durbin-Watson were calculated during the second-stage before 
implementing the AR1 process in the system. Though D-W is in the 
indeterminate region of the Durbin-Watson statistic for the price equation; 
estimates are reported are corrected for first-order autocorrelation. 
3Due to statistical package constraints, the statistic is calculated without 
correcting for autocorrelation. 
4Variance inflation factor for CHHIA = 1.06 and DOM = 1.10 were a 
value greater than 5 indicates severe multicollinearity (Marquardt and 
Snee 1975).  Variance inflation factors over 5 are associated only with the 
weight variables. 
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Intercept  6.90 7.02 
(3.32) (3.31) 
L1SP  0.09* 0.09* 
(0.01) (0.01) 
HHIA  -0.0003*  
(0.0001)  
CHHIA   -0.0003* 
 (0.0001) 
DOM  -2.66* -2.62* 
(0.10) (0.10) 
HC  -1.89* -1.88* 
(0.10) (0.10) 
NEG  -7.23* -7.24* 
(0.13) (0.13) 
WT  0.05* 0.05* 
(0.01) (0.01) 
WT
2  -0.00002* -0.00002* 
(6.10E-6) (6.10E-6) 
WT
3  5.49E-9* 5.56E-9* 
(1.55E-9) (1.56E-9) 
ST  -0.002* -0.002* 
(0.001) (0.001) 
T  0.0002* 0.0002* 
(0.00002) (0.00002) 
R
2   0.58  0.59 




*Significantly different from zero, α = 0.01.  
1Though D-W is in the indeterminate region of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic; Yule-Walker estimates are reported 
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Table A.5:  Variables and t-tests Related to Price, Cattle Characteristics and Market 
Shares for Sales 10 and 23, Figure B.4.  
 
Variable per Principal  Mean for  
Sale 10 
Mean for All  
Other Sales 
Mean for 
 Sale 23 
Mean for All Other 
Sales 
SP 33.73  32.73  33.59*  37.78* 
NEG 0.14  0.21
1 0.14  0.14 
HC 0.75  0.81  0.75*  0.85
1* 
WT 1283.32  1276.39  1282.57  1304.79 
Market Share Prin1  0.24  0.20  0.24  0.21 
Market Share Prin2  0.24  0.21  0.24  0.23 
Market Share Prin3  0.24  0.21  0.24  0.18 
Market Share Prin4  0.02  0.01
1 0.02  0.0
1* 
Market Share Prin5  0.08  0.07  0.08*  0.22
1* 
Market Share Prin6  0.08*  0.23
1*  0.08 0.07 
Market Share Prin7  0.02  0.01
1 0.02  0.02 
Market Share Prin8  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03
1 
Market Share Prin9  0.02  0.05
1 0.02  0.01
1 
Market Share 
OtherBuyer  0.04 0.01
1* 0.04  0.01
1 
Market Share DOM  0.74*  0.62*  0.74*  0.63* 
1Mean differences using Cochrane and Cox t-tests are reported when the equal variance 
assumption was violated according to the Folded form F-statistic; otherwise the results of pooled 
t-tests are reported (SAS Institute 2009, Chapt. 67, 3578-3579).   
*Reject the Ho: equal means, α = 0.01. Appendix B:  Figures of Data Description 
 

























Prin1 Prin2 Prin3 Prin4 Prin5 Prin6 Prin7 Prin8 Prin9 Other  
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Figure B.2: Example Transition Period Determination Comparing the Overall 10 Period 
Moving Average Standard Deviation CHHIA to the Sale Specific 10 Period Moving 
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1.11 Endnotes 
 
1 See GIPSA Industry assessments from 2000 to 2005. 
http://www.gipsa.usda.gov/GIPSA/webapp?area=home&subject=lmp&topic=ir-as  
2 Cull cows do not meet the productivity requirements of their current owner, typically ranchers, dairymen and 
feeders.  The cows may be suffering from lameness, cancer, infertility, mastitis or simply old age.  These cows vary 
regionally and may be dairy or beef cows.  In economic terms, these cattle could be accurately described as salvage 
goods. 
3 For a discussion related to live animal predictors see Gresham et al. 1986: O’Mara et al. 1998. 
4 Commission agents are paid on a flat-fee for service basis.  The commission agent’s payment is calculated by 
taking the $/cwt multiplied by the # cwt purchased.   For example, for a commission agent that purchases a 48,000 
lb truck load of cattle at a rate of $0.50/cwt, the agent’s payment would be $240.00.  To alleviate the incentive 
compatibility problem of this type of compensation scheme, commission agents maintain and expand their contracts 
by purchasing at or below the principal’s minimum profit/loss requirements. Typically, buyers for packers are 
allowed up to only a 1 percent error in pricing any classification of cattle. 
5 A dominant purchaser may be simply described as one that maintains the largest market share.  However, we use 
the more strict antitrust inference of monopoly power arising from a firm controlling at least 75 percent of the 
market before sufficient market power has been established.  This has been a general standard that courts have used 
before determining whether a defendant has enough market power to be charged with a section 2 violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act (Gavil, Kovacic and Baker 2002, 575-576). 
6 According to the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, when the post-merger HHI exceeds 1800, it will be 
presumed that mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points are likely to create or enhance 
market power or facilitate its exercise.  In accordance to Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among 
Competitors, 2000 a buyer collaboration is essentially a ‘merger-in-part’. 
7 Traditional meaning that auction prices are analyzed without structural identification of optimal bidding strategies 
derived from observed bids and the unobserved underlying private and common value distributions.  For further 
discussion of structural estimation techniques for pure and common value auctions see Paarsch, H.J. and H. Hong 
(2006), Athey, S. and P.A. Haile (2002) Laffont, J. and Q. Vuong (1996).  
8 Common bidding agency raises competition concerns and, depending upon the business purpose for the agreement 
and the potential harm to competition, may be condemnable by the courts either under a per se or rule of reason 
analysis.  The difference between a per se and rule of reason analysis is that a per se violation necessarily reduces 
competition and shows no potential for procompetitive benefits, while a rule of reason analysis is applied when the 
actions of the party or parties may result in significant efficiencies which could not be attained by a less restrictive 
means. For a more detailed discussion see FTC, USDJ 1999. “Types of agreements that have been held per se illegal 
include agreements among competitors to fix prices or output, rig bids, or share or divide markets by allocating 
customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce.” (p 3).  “Rule of reason analysis focuses on the state of 
competition with, as compared to without, the relevant agreement. The central question is whether the relevant 
agreement likely harms competition by increasing the ability or incentive to profitably to raise price above or reduce 
output, quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.” (p 
4). 
9 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, 
2000. 
10 For an overview of potential exclusionary anticompetitive behavior by dominant firms see Gavil, Kovacic and 
Baker (2002), chapter 6, Dominant Firm Behavior Having Exclusionary Effects.  Based on research by 
Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) and Salop and Scheffman (1983), Gavil, Kovacic and Baker raise two main 
competition concerns arising from the presence of a dominant firm: 1) the ability of the dominant firm to ‘raise 
rivals costs’ thus reducing competition by reducing the competitiveness of rival firms and 2) the potential of the 
dominant firm to create an involuntary cartel member via credible threats of ‘raising rivals’ costs’ (pp.634-641).  
Gavil, Kovacic, and Baker also summarize Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 
890 (1993), where they state “[I]t is generally required that to demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff 
must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory of anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to 
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.”, 562-563.  The potential for   52
                                                                                                                                                             
exclusionary effects are also noted, but not discussed, in the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among 
Competitors (FTC and USDJ 1999), footnote 5.   
11 Sharing a common agent facilitates collusion among collaborating principals even if the principals engage the 
services of the common agent independently (Bernheim and Whinston 1985, 1986).  Also, for an overview of the 
concentration and collusion concerns related to competitor collaborations see FTC and USDJ 1999.  
12 See Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 82 S.Ct. 1502, page 319.  Also cited by the district court in FTC v. Heinz, 
116 F.Supp.2d 190 as one justification to allow two smaller but significant firms to merge (Heinz and Beech-Nut) to 
enhance product innovation competition with the baby food industry’s giant (Gerber).  The appellate court did not 
argue with the District Court’s use of Brown Shoe, but did not support the District Court’s findings based on the 
facts presented at trial (see *718 **374 b. Rebuttal Arguments rebuttal arguments, 3. Innovation in FTC v. Heinz, 
246 F.3d 708,  345 U.S.App.D.C. 364.) 
13 Refer to footnote 4. 
14 This percentage is likely much higher as the reporting requirements for packers allow them to report dealer 
purchases as non-market purchases.  Recently P&S reported that in fact cull cow packers purchase most of their 
cattle at auction (USDA, GIPSA 2009). 
15 USDA, GIPSA 2008 reports that 3,101,000 head of cows were sold through public auctions.  The estimate was 
derived assuming that cows weigh on average 1500 pounds.  The average price for cull cows is $0.51 per pound, 
which is a simple average calculated from information collected by the Livestock Marketing Information Center. 
16 Dealers, though allegedly principals themselves, receive multiple resale offers (fixed order-prices) from other 
principals.  Dealer profit is calculated from the winning-bid to order-price spread less expenses.  It is not uncommon 
that dealers are willing to accept market location assignments by principals.  This request is made by the principal to 
eliminate inter-agent competition.  By accepting the competition restriction, the dealer becomes an agent of the 
principal.  Therefore, it is quite likely that a significant portion of the dealer purchases are truly made by common 
agents, rather than by independent purchasers as the statistic suggests.   
17 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229b. 
18 Though GIPSA has recently dropped common agents (joint buying) as a serious industry issue, the complaint has 
continued to be unresolved.  See GIPSA Industry assessments from 2000 to 2004 
(http://www.gipsa.usda.gov/GIPSA/webapp?area=home&subject=lmp&topic=ir-as). 
19 No indication in the report was given whether this violation was related to collusion or common agency. 
20 See Swift & Company v. United States, 393 F.2d. 247 (7
th Cir. 1968). 
21 See San Jose Valley Veal, Inc., 34 Agric.Dec. 966 (1975) 3. 
22 In Hennessey, 57 Agric.Dec. 1432 (1998).  The agency provided no evidence that the two firms sharing the 
common agent were competitors.  Forced to rely on the collaborators product market definition, the court ruled that 
since the collaborators were not competitors, the common agency would have no foreseeable anticompetitive effect. 
The agency, relying on past precedents per se illegality of common agency did not provide any statistical analysis of 
price impacts at trial. 
23 See Monfort of Colorado v. Cargill, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 683, 706 (D. Colo. 1983), aff’d, 761 F.2d 570 (10
th 
Cir.1985), judgment rev’d, 479 U.S. 104 (1986).   
24 July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
25 5 U.S.C § 14, § 18, and § 19. 
26 15 U.S.C §§ 41-58, as amended. 
27 Nelson considered only the number of winning bidders as his concentration measure and the ratio of cars to 
bidders as measuring the size of the auction.  However, the ratio of cars to bidders is clearly another concentration 
measure and was likely highly correlated with the number of bidders. 
28 For repeated private value auctions see von der Fehr (1994). 
29 When n = 2, optimal strategies in second-price and English auction and outcomes are identical. 
30 This also applies when the probability that the advantaged bidder in fact has an advantage approaches 1. 
31 The authors note that there exist ‘bully-sucker’ equilibria in pure common value auctions and that the advantaged 
bidder may be emboldened by their common value advantage. 
32 The study justified the strategic bidding behavior for cattle as a private value auction based on the inclusion of all 
relevant cattle characteristics guaranteed by the seller.  However, the fact that characteristics are guaranteed has little 
bearing upon the correct definition of the bidder’s information set.  For instance, the seller only guarantees that a 
cow has milked X liters per day prior to the auction but cannot guarantee how long the cow will continue to produce   53
                                                                                                                                                             
at X liters per day. Typically with guaranteed production, there is a time limit associated with how long the 
guarantee will last.  For instance, sellers of guaranteed bred cows in the U.S. cannot guarantee that the cow will 
ultimately have the calf because the seller cannot be held liable for the production practices of the buyer which 
impact the likelihood that the cow will carry the calf to term.  Also, and more importantly, sellers do not guarantee 
how good the calf will grow once born.  Therefore in regards to live animal purchases, if either a structural bidding 
model is to be econometrically identified or if a traditional model is to be employed, the structural model or a priori 
expectations must admit that bidders are faced with at least a pure or almost common value unknown at the time the 
animal is purchased.  
33 Refer to footnote 2. 
34 Auction companies typically ‘support’ their markets by occasionally purchasing cattle they feel did not bring a 
deserving value for the seller.  This is a costly enterprise as the auction company out bids the buyers, and then resells 
the animal later in the sale to the same buyers who either bid the original low price or strategically reduce the price 
to increase the market support costs of the auction company.  Auction companies can also engage a competitive 
buyer to function as market support.  However, the buyer will not accept purchasing at any price higher than need be 
as he is left with the animal to resell, hopefully at a profit.  Mainly, the value of an outside market support buyer is 
to guarantee a credible price floor, or in the current case, simply another buyer. 
35 Cow feeders either feed cull cows they have purchased or feed cull animals on behalf of other firms.  Dealers are 
speculators by trade who purchase on their own accounts, reselling animals without significantly subjecting their 
purchases to further processing or production.  Producers are typically dairy, feeder, farmer or ranchers.  “Other” 
includes one-time or infrequent purchasers who were producers. 
36 According to the auction firm, the common agent’s dominance has existed for many years prior to the analysis 
period and has maintained one of their orders even though the principal packing plant has changed ownership since 
the time frame of this analysis. 
37 These attributes are visual appraisals and were recorded by the auctioneer.  Examples of negative attributes would 
be lameness, mastitis udders or cancer eyes.  These negative attributes affect the usefulness of the animal for further 
production (feeding, milking, calving or slaughter), and are in fact causes for culling from production.  Negative 
attributes such as lameness reduce the red meat yield as the effected areas are normally condemned. 
38 At a typical auction for cattle bids are submitted by gestures.  It may take only 30 seconds to sell an animal during 
which numerous bids may occur.  Recording all bids would be a formidable task in this auctioning environment.  
However, electronic auctions that record all bidding activity would not suffer from this limitation.  
39 Access to buyer profit and loss statements and principal buy-orders fall under the jurisdiction of regulatory 
agencies. 
40 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, 
2000. 
41 Though not specifically addressed in Hennessey, the relevant geographic market is defined to include a single 
auction market location.  The government’s definition of geographic submarkets which are based on delivery points 
by suppliers, see U.S. v. Cargill, Inc., 2000 WL 1475752, 2000-2 Trade Cases  P 72,966, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. P 
28,212  (D.D.C. Jun 30, 2000) (NO. CIV. A. 991875GK).   
42 When live animal evaluations are adjusted for major flaws, live animal weight becomes a good indicator of red 
meat yield and cutability, though other contributing factors such as fat cover and muscling would provide a more 
accurate description (Gil 1998; and O’Mara et al. 1998). However, delineations along these live animal attributes is 
flawed because: 1) live animal evaluation is not precise even with trained buyers
42 and 2) carcass quality definitions 
drawn on grading systems result in significant overlap of the multiple traits that consumers prefer (Hodgson et al. 
1992). 
43 The auction market currently analyzed does not pre sort cull cows based on weight or any other physical 
characteristic. 
44 According to Kreps and Scheinkman’s seminal work (1983), under some stringent rationing rules (i.e., posted 
prices), if firms first choose output before price, the resulting competition is Cournot rather than Bertrand.  Since a 
dominant bidder is analyzed and the concentration is high, a cumulative CR4 may also be an appropriate 
concentration measure (Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter, 1986). 
45 The CHHI calculated from the entire data series was used for the first auction’s starting CHHI measure. 
46 A sensitivity analysis of various transition weighting procedures is not currently provided in the results section.  
However, there is noticeable improvement in fit by using the described weighting scheme over the initial CHHI.   54
                                                                                                                                                             
47 This is much higher than the nationally calculated HHI of 936 for 2006 as reported by GIPSA for the cull cow 
packing industry (USDA, GIPSA 2008).  The reported concentration index is more appropriate for calculating the 
concentration of firm output. 
48 See footnote 10. 
49 While unobserved outside market factors are expected to continually change influencing buy-orders in real-time, 
these factors are also expected to change between auction sessions.  For instance, firms continually update their 
purchasing decisions based on their net positions in the futures market, simultaneous purchases made at other 
auction locations and completion of current output orders.  However, new output orders and production difficulties 
are expected to be lumpy in nature and may or may not change drastically between auction sessions.  Agents are 
able to incorporate outside market factor information from their principals and observe the influence of these outside 
market factors upon their rivals bidding during the auction session. 
50 The total R
2 for the OLS first stage price equation related to the alternative agent and principal concentration 
measures was 0.59 and 0.59.  The total R
2 values for the OLS first stage agent and principal concentration equations 
were 0.99 and 0.96.  
51 Order condition states: Rank(R1)=J ≥ M-1, where J is the #restrictions and M is number of endogenous variables.  
Rank condition states Rank(R1Δ)=M-1, where Δ is the composite matrix of endogenous and exogenous coefficients 
to be estimated including the restrictions on all coefficients.  Sales Price order condition: J=M-1=1 and Rank 
condition = 1 => equation exactly identified.  CHHI(A,P) order condition: J>M-1 (3>1) and Rank condition = 1 => 
equation overidentified. 
52 Cautionary note: due to procedural constraints in SAS, Basmann’s statistic was calculated without correction of 
autocorrelation. 
53 The Durbin-Watson statistic is an appropriate indicator of autocorrelation in this model because the lagged 
endogenous variables are instruments (Green, 2003, pp 277-78).  First order autocorrelation was adjusted for with no 
expected improvement or harm to the estimation of the standard errors.  There did not appear to be a significant 
difference between the OLS and autocorrelated adjusted standard errors. 
54 These were in fact the claims made by the market support agent. 
55 Though the relationship between the HHI and Lerner Index is nonlinear, the relationship between the HHI and 
winning bids is unknown. 